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6 
People, animals and biosecurity in and through cities 
Steve Hinchliffe and Nick Bingham 
 
1. Introduction [h1] 
As many chapters in this volume have demonstrated, SARS gave stark relief to the 
connections between urban public health and other places and others’ lives (not just 
human lives).  In this chapter we add to this geography and ecology of disease by 
noting that cities are not just places where viruses eventually end up and cause havoc.  
They are not simply dense collections of people that are vulnerable through global 
networks that connect them to the ‘pre-modern’ agricultural practices of ‘elsewhere’ 
where people and animals mix tissues and excretions.  For two reasons.  First, cities 
are also very much a-modern.  Many cities and many parts of cities around the world 
are no better than their rural hinterlands in terms of services (Davis, 2006), and all are 
full of animals.  Second, world cities are rarely, if ever, simply victims of global 
shifts.  They are of course important sites of intensive orderings, where matters as 
diverse as landscapes and viral forms are organised and distributed.  Many chapters in 
this book rightly point to the uneven quality of life in cities and to the vulnerabilities 
that are distributed across and within world cities.  Thus the interconnections between 
world cities can produce a particular patterning of viral lives.  But we also need to 
remember that cities are not simply networked, they also network.  They are not 
globalized but form focal points where globalisation is done.   
 
This combination of the a-modern, living city and the networking effects of cities 
means they are places where issues of biosecurity are starting to be realised and 
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played out.  Loosely speaking biosecurity refers to a set of procedures and 
infrastructures which seek to control and police the movements of living matters.  As 
a topic of concern it has mainly surfaced in rural locations, partly as a result of the 
understanding that rural livestock production is the so-called front-line in the 
generation and distribution of zoonotic diseases (Braun 2007).  While this is 
undoubtedly the case, we will argue that biosecurity is also an issue for urban areas 
which are rife with living things (humans and animals).  Cities, as living places 
(Hinchliffe and Whatmore, 2006) are made up of dense networks of living relations 
and are therefore as important to the making and breaking of biosecurity as any rural 
location.  Indeed, it almost goes without saying in this book that the dense networks 
and the concentrations of human inhabitants in close proximity make for high risk 
disease ecologies.  But it should also be added that cities are, and always have been, 
full of other animals too.  Their role in biosecurity practices needs more attention. 
Our main site is Cairo, a city that has long been seen as a colonial site that is 
both networked and which networks (Mitchell 2002).  Our case is the arrival of highly 
pathogenic avian influenza in winter 2005/6.  More broadly we look at the attempts to 
control and eradicate avian influenza within Egypt through biosecurity measures.  
Such measures are channelled through and within Cairo to peri-urban, rural, wild and 
domestic settings where people and birds interact.  Our focus on the city does two 
things.  First we note how Cairo acts as a site for a gathering together of orderings.  It 
is a place of networking that makes and repairs links to other world cities, 
international governments, international organizations, disease control centres, 
surveillance operations and so on.  Second, we argue that rather than biosecurity 
being a case of a militarised state imposing orders upon a populace, our urban focus 
allows us to trace the rough textures of disease ‘control’ networks.  Our argument is 
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that cities mark places where the never finished products of state and society are 
actually being made and re-made, where expertise is being re-distributed through an 
attempted elimination of certain city-nature formations (Hinchliffe 1999).  We 
conclude by arguing that biosecure states emerge in practices, are always incomplete 
and are far from secure.   
 
 We start the chapter with a brief introduction to the term biosecurity.  
Following this we outline the avian influenza disease group and then provide an 
account of Egyptian disease control practices.  The paper ends with a discussion of 
the fraught relation between networks and control. 
2. Biosecurities [h1] 
 Biosecurity involves lots of things and practices.  In terms of its things, a brief 
review of the uses of the term suggests at least three elements.  First there are the 
attempts to manage the movement of agricultural pests and diseases, with the aim of 
protecting national agricultural productivity.  Second, there are the attempts to 
reduce the effects of invasive species on so-called indigenous flora and fauna, or the 
protection of national natures.  Third, there are the dangers of purposeful and 
inadvertent spreading of biological agents into the human population.  This protection 
of human populations focuses on laboratories which handle potentially hazardous 
organisms, possible uses of pathogens in bioweapons and bioterrorism, and the 
possible crossings of animal borne diseases into the human species (zoonotic 
diseases). 
 
 Biosecurity also involves different forms of security practices.  Collier and 
Lakoff (2006), in part following Foucault (Foucault 1973; Foucault 1977), identify 
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three political logics of security.  The first of these, Nation-State Security, has its 
roots in the establishment of states in 17th Century Europe, and involves the will to 
secure territorial sovereignty.  It is premised on a bipolar world of friend and enemy, 
its spatialisation into territorial units and a militarisation of various borders.  The latter 
can be external or internal (the enemy within), with the result that policing borders 
becomes a matter of foreign and domestic policy.  Second, there is the logic of 
population security.  With its origins in late 19th Century social welfare reforms, 
population security involves attempts to improve overall and individual levels of and 
access to health and welfare by organising the purchase of health and social securities.  
The collectivisation of health and social safety nets through public and private 
insurance and through the organisation of health and social infrastructures are the 
main recognisable instances of population security.  Finally, for Collier and Lakoff, 
there is Vital Systems Security.  This is a mid-20th Century response to the 
development of extreme emergencies, including most notably the possibility of 
nuclear attack or other incalculable, and thereby uninsurable, events which lie outside 
the technologies of formal risk assessments (earthquakes, hurricanes).  The logic here 
is preparedness and emergency planning.   
 Putting these biosecurities together we can start to map matters of concern 
with characteristic responses.  And yet, as a reading of the table (below) will confirm, 
biosecurities are not easily separated into single forms or single logics.  There are 
overlaps that require us to look more carefully at biosecurity operations.  
[insert Table 1] 
 To elaborate we can make four related points:  First, in practice, a particular 
thing may not fall neatly into the categorisations outlined above.  As we will develop 
later in the chapter, the current avian flu situation, for example, mixes aspects of the 
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ecological integrity issue (the importation of exotic birds along with seasonal 
migrations), aspects of the agricultural disease issue (the spread into and within 
domestic poultry and other bird stocks), and aspects of the human health issues (the 
risk of infection to those humans living and working with poultry and the wider fears 
of the development of a human to human transmissible form of influenza from 
H5N1).  Second, as Foucault reminds us (a point repeated in the recent collective 
work of Rabinow, Collier & Lakoff) in practice, a form of security is always already 
multiple in that it involves at least assemblages, apparatuses, and normativities which 
while mostly hanging together, never completely coincide.  Thirdly, different logics 
or orderings do not exist in historical or geographical isolation, replacing one another 
completely from time to time or varying completely from place to place.  Rather (and 
Foucault is again very clear about this), they are added to one another, sometimes 
arising in answer to the failing of previous orderings, but always interpenetrating to a 
greater or lesser extent.  Finally, security is probably not best understood as a matter 
of responding to an already defined threat.  Security (as Foucault once again 
demonstrated only too well), is about the public production of norms, their 
surveillance, regulation and enaction (Foucault 1977).  Thus, the three forms of 
collective security detailed earlier (state, population, and vital systems) are never 
simply a reaction to self-evident hazards, but always at least in part about the 
constitution of both a particular kind of body politic (self-contained, healthy, alert 
respectively) and a particular kind of bio-insecurity (fear of the outside, 
hypochondria, terror of the inevitable respectively).   
 
 What this situation suggests is that one form of security is unlikely to be either 
pure in form or dominant in terms of effect, and that analytically and politically it is 
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worth exploring the complexities, inter-topological effects, and crossings that occur 
when biosecurities are put into practice.  Some of this work which would elucidate 
precise configurations of ways of life (bios), sickness (nosos) and the law (nomos) 
(Thacker 2005b) already exists, but (much) more remains to be done.  Here we work 
with the multiple practices that make up avian influenzas in order to elaborate on the 
possibilities once we recognise the contingencies of more than one kind of actor and 
more than one enaction of disease. 
Ordering avian influenzas [h1]  
Avian influenza or bird flu is a common enough condition for wild and domestic 
birds.  Indeed, the wide variety of subtypes of influenza virus (all 16 haemagluttinin 
and 9 neuraminidase subtypes of influenza viruses are known to infect wild 
waterfowl, WHO (2006a)), provides a large reservoir of viruses which ‘perpetually 
circulate’ in bird populations (WHO 2006a).  In many cases such viral infections 
produce few clinical effects (ruffled feathers, reduced egg production in poultry and 
little else).  However, more pathogenic and lethal forms of avian flu exist which can 
spread rapidly and approach a lethality rate of close to 100% in birds.  All are H5 or 
H7 subtypes with a distinctive set of amino acids in the cleavage site of 
haemagluttinin.  Not all H5 or H7 subtypes are highly pathogenic but, according to 
the WHO, “H5 and H7 viruses of low pathogenicity can, after circulation for 
sometimes short periods in a poultry population, mutate into highly pathogenic 
viruses” (WHO 2006a page 1).  How avian influenza viruses circulate and how they 
change is a topic of vital concern for bird health.  But it is also of concern for many 
other species too, for subtypes of avian influenza can jump species.   
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 Trans-species crossings of avian flu viruses to humans have been relatively 
uncommon and have to date and in the main produced only mild forms of human 
disease.  The exception is the H5N1 strain which had already crossed to humans in 
1997 (in Hong Kong where there were 18 cases) and whose crossings have gradually 
increased in frequency and distribution in recent years.  While individual cases have 
been tragic and caused human suffering, outbreaks have remained limited in number.  
Notably, they have all occurred at the same time as H5N1 has been clinically present 
in nearby poultry flocks, and there have as yet been few if any clear cases of human to 
human transmission.  All of which suggests that the current H5N1 virus is poorly 
adapted to its human host.  For many, the more worrying danger is that H5N1 or 
another avian influenza virus will develop the capability to move quickly and 
effectively through human populations, as it undergoes reassortments (where avian 
and human viruses ‘exchange’ genetic material during a co-infection of a host pig or 
human) or through gradual adaptive mutations.  While the latter may be detectable 
through a pattern of relatively small clusters of disease incidence and limited human 
to human transmission, reassortment may give rise to a rapid onset of a pandemic 
strain whose spread along existing networks could well prove so fast that current 
detection systems based on syndromic surveillance or even environmental monitoring 
followed by bioassay techniques would be too slow to signal a warning. 
 
 The mutability and adaptability of viruses along with the complexity, intensity 
and density of animal-human and human-human interactions makes for a complex 
political and policy environment (Wilbert 2006), especially in large, densely 
populated cities.  It is to this environment and to the interventions being made in the 
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name of staving off the prospect of urban animal and human disease that this chapter 
now turns. 
 
Cairo and Avian flu – making Cairo urban [h1] 
 According to many official sources, avian flu is a disease carried by migrating 
wild fowl, passing to domestic bird life through physical contact, itself a result of 
poorly secured bird keeping premises.  Any danger of the disease spreading to people 
is also through direct physical contact, with poorly regulated poultry handling a cause 
for concern.  Where wild and domestic birds exist in close and visceral proximity to 
pigs and people the risk of highly infectious diseases crossing species barriers is 
considered to be at its highest.  One WHO document expands, 
 
 ‘Most human cases of H5N1 avian influenza have occurred in rural or 
 periurban areas where many households keep small domestic poultry flocks. 
 The H5N1 avian influenza virus is probably transmitted to humans through 
 exposure during slaughter, defeathering, butchering and preparation of 
 domestic poultry for cooking.’ (WHO 2006b: 2) 
 
 Following this simple infection story, an equally straightforward plan of action 
has emerged.  Control is easiest, it is argued, in large commercial farms, “where birds 
are housed indoors, usually under strictly controlled sanitary conditions, in large 
numbers.  Control is far more difficult under poultry production systems in which 
most birds are raised in small backyard flocks scattered throughout rural or periurban 
areas” (WHO 2006a: 2).  The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in New 
York –coordinating the global response closely with both the WHO in Geneva and 
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Global Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) in Paris – followed suit, reversing its 
earlier policy of encouraging small scale poultry farming (as a means to development, 
self-sufficiency, and small business promotion).  Instead it had turned to encouraging 
secure factory farms.   
 
 So as avian flu started to appear more frequently and be more widely 
distributed from 2003 onwards, a control network was being mobilised in Geneva, 
New York, Paris and Hong Kong.  The network was informed by and in some senses 
solidified the main narrative/ aetiology.  So, with the prospect of the H5N1 virus 
reaching Egypt becoming ever more likely, the government in Cairo took up the 
disease narrative and started to enact a programme of disease control.  In the autumn 
of 2005 the government announced a series of measures: hunting of wild ducks and 
quail was banned; imports of poultry from infected countries were prohibited; there 
was to be increased border monitoring, and migratory flocks were to be subject to 
virological surveillance.   
 
 Despite these measures, Cairo’s place within a network of abundant 
international flows generated a sense of foreboding.  In a communication made in 
mid-October 2005 by the WHO’s Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean, 
itself located in Cairo, it was noted that ‘migratory bird flyways pass through the 
EMR [Eastern Mediterranean Region] on their way between Asia, Europe, and 
Africa’ and ‘daily dynamic interaction with other countries in the world (expatriate 
workers, trade, religious visitors, and tourism) could easily result in the introduction 
of influenza into the Region’ (EMRO-WHO 2005: 1).  The same report made it very 
plain that states needed to behave as model citizens in order to maintain public 
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(global) health.  ‘What is expected from countries’, identifying highly pathogenic 
avian influenza is ‘rapidly and appropriately destroy[ing] all infected or exposed birds 
with proper destruction or carcasses’, ‘functional and efficient influenza surveillance 
hand in hand with focussed and timely public health measures’, ‘reasonable stockpiles 
of Tamiflu’, ‘production of influenza vaccines’, and ‘an efficient communication 
system’ (EMRO-WHO 2005: 2-3). 
 
 Having convened a ‘Supreme National Committee to Combat Bird Flu’ with 
representatives from the ministries of defence, agriculture, and health as well as the 
WHO, officials were at pains to assure a doubtful and distrusting Egyptian public that 
all possible safety measures had been taken and that there would be open and 
transparent reporting of any avian influenza cases.  Whether or not this was the case 
(and with a prestigious African Nations Football tournament taking place in Egypt 
immediately beforehand, there were doubts as to the actual timing of events and 
reportage) the official statement that H5N1 had reached Egypt came in mid February 
2006.   
 
 Despite indications that the initial outbreaks had occurred at least in part on 
factory farms, public officials began stressing the safety of such ‘highly controlled 
environments’ and suggested that the vast majority of reported cases were occurring 
in flocks of home raised birds.  After banning poultry movements, the main policy 
response was to announce a cull of all backyard and rooftop poultry and the banning 
of live bird markets (where 80% of the country’s poultry was sold).  Echoing the joint 
WHO/FAO/OIE line and specifically the words of a senior FAO official who had 
declared that ‘The fight against bird flu must be waged in the backyard of the world’s 
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poor’ (quoted in Grain 2006a: 3), the Prime Minister, Ahmed Nazif, announced the 
ban with the following words: ‘The world is moving towards big farms because they 
can be controlled under veterinarian supervision […] the time has come to get rid the 
idea of the breeding chickens on the roofs of houses’ (quoted in Grain 2006b: 1).  
 
 This replacement of roof top and back yard agriculture with industrial poultry 
production represented a hugely significant intervention into Cairo’s urban ecology 
and the political ecology of Egypt more generally.  Urban subsistence production in 
Egypt generally and small scale animal husbandry in the capital in particular had 
taken on a new importance over the previous two decades.  The reasons for this 
growth relate in part to shifts in rural land tenure and resultant increases in rural 
landless labourers, increasing rural urban migrations and an increase in numbers of 
urban poor, many of whom were used to keeping livestock.  In addition to this 
growing urban population, reductions in food subsidies from the 1970s onwards, 
increases in food imports, the privatisation and deregulation of strategic food supplies 
(see for example Mitchell 2002), combined to drive food prices up, and made home 
poultry production especially attractive.  One fairly conservative estimate put the 
proportion of Cairo households that kept animals at 16%, rising to well over 25% 
once the informal settlements and the former villages were included (Gertel & Samir 
2000).  The keeping of birds – particularly chickens and ducks – was a way of life for 
people (especially women) in the low income, densely populated parts of the city: a 
cheap way of adding expensive animal protein to the family diet (95% of this farming 
was for home consumption).  Meanwhile, the home produced meat was often 
perceived as being cleaner than bought-in meat, and livestock acted as an economic 
buffer of sorts in times of increased hardship (ibid.).  This living city (Hinchliffe & 
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Whatmore 2006) was not one that matched the ideal city envisioned by modernisers 
and planners.  Indeed, the announcement of the rooftop cull dovetailed with other 
interventions in city life, and the ongoing re-branding of Cairo as a modern, world 
city (Mitchell, 2002).  
 
Modernity and Biosecurity in practice [h1] 
The cull was led by teams of officials from the ministries of health, agriculture, and 
environment and enforced by the security forces.  Despite this, and despite the issuing 
of fines for keeping birds and the encouragement to report neighbours who didn’t 
comply with the plan of action, the cull was far from clean or smooth.  Some 
householders hid their birds and refused to let apparently healthy birds join the cull.  
Compensation levels were unattractive, so sub-clinical birds were rushed to markets 
in order to realise their best monetary value.  When the disease struck, sub-clinical 
birds were killed by farmers in order to ‘rescue them’ (as people called it) from the 
disease (Slackman 2006).  These dead but infective birds then circulated through 
markets and into food chains.  As chickens were given up to the cull, many 
households kept their ducks as these seemed to stay healthy (ducks are good at 
shielding the virus).  The secretion of live household birds to keep them safe and the 
dumping of diseased birds in canals and water ways by both individuals and the 
authorities may have risked greater spread of disease.  In Spring, avian influenza had 
claimed its first human victim in Egypt (one of six deaths of fourteen infected).  There 
had not been anywhere near enough vaccine or Tamiflu available and stocks were 
urgently having to be imported at great expense.   
 The collapse in home produced poultry and the fall in demand for Egyptian 
poultry more generally (35% of poultry farms reportedly closed down and one third or 
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1 million farm workers were laid off), resulted in a 40% price hike for fish and non-
bird meat (Leila 2006a).  Attempts by the government to then import chickens led to 
street demonstrations as workers in the poultry industry protested the effect this would 
have on their businesses.   
 
 These practical difficulties in managing the disease in terms of urban food 
provision, public health, employment and economies, were exacerbated outside the 
city.  Poor information, non-compliance and a lack of personnel made the cull 
completely unenforceable in practice in the 20 of Egypt’s 26 governorates where bird 
flu had been detected.  As a result authorities in Cairo had to declare that backyard 
flocks could be kept as long as they were healthy and caged. 
 
 In early summer a report by a parliamentary committee asked to assess the 
government’s handling of the situation was highly critical of the ways in which the 
outbreak had been handled (Leila 2006b).  Criticism focused on a number of areas 
including a lack of consultation at the planning stage with civil society groups, poor 
public information, the rash announcement of the cull which had led to a spreading of 
disease after infected birds were left on streets and on the banks of rivers, absence of 
measures to protect the livelihoods of dealers with infected birds, unhygienic transport 
of culled bird carcasses to often unsuitable burial sites, and a confused avian 
vaccination policy (exacerbated by the fact that after expensive supplies of vaccine 
had eventually arrived from China, its use only served to spread the virus) (Leila 
2006b). 
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 Despite these failings, the mass killing of birds had seemingly reduced the 
problem.  New infections had declined by early summer and to all intents and 
purposes the country was thought to be free from the disease by mid 2006.  According 
to the vice-head of the Poultry Union, success was not due to the preventative 
measures taken by the government and was simply explained by the extermination of 
an estimated 34 million birds in the cull.  In a few weeks : ‘Egypt lost 75% of its egg-
laying flocks and 50% of all fowl.  Since there is almost no poultry in the country, 
infection rates of bird flu are decreasing’ (quoted in Leila 2006b: 1).   
 
 The decimation and subsequent re-building of poultry stocks was far from 
being evenly distributed.  The latter was most evident when the Cairo Poultry 
Company increased its capital, paid out dividends and announced plans to build a new 
100 million Egyptian Dollar slaughterhouse in Noubaria.  The new facility would 
increase the company’s output by 350% from the present level of 80,000 chickens 
slaughtered per day to 280,000, and the company hoped that it would supply 10% of 
the country’s poultry consumption (Rasromani 2006).   
 
 At this point it might be argued that even though the method and practice was 
undoubtedly messy, the results were predictable.  Looking beyond the local practices 
it might be argued that big capital and government had held sway.  Certainly, 
industrially integrated farming in Egypt seemed to be doing better than household 
farms.  However, it may be that such an outcome is neither inevitable nor 
incontestable.  As the next subsection details, there are other narratives which 
undermine this sense of an onward march of a modern, technological state. 
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4.  Overlaps, interferences and netwars [h1] 
The particular doing of biosecurity in Egypt following the detection of highly 
pathogenic bird flu, with its military style cull of bird stocks would, at first blush, 
suggest a nation state security response to a known threat.  The attempt was to cleanse 
the country of the enemy virus and in so doing enact a modernist, urban and 
industrial- agricultural landscape.  The associated removal of urban and peri-urban 
livelihoods, and wholesale changes to the political ecologies of livestock certainly 
suggest the imposition of martial law and a concomitant curtailing of civil liberties.  
However, to tell the story in this way would be to over-emphasise the ‘orderly’ nature 
of the process.  Securing also involved many other practices, in a variety of locations 
and with a variety of effects.  The result is that to talk of a single logic, or to even talk 
of a dominant power is rather premature.  It is for this reason that we prefer to speak 
of biosecuring rather than securitisation or even biosecurity.  We can make two points 
here.  First of all, biosecuring involved practices of surveillance and self regulation 
which were not simply about territory and securing boundaries but also about the 
policing of populations (chickens and people) and the extensions of some liberties 
(e.g. trade and large corporations) over others (animals, small holders).  Second, as 
this suggests, securing took place in many locations, involving many different things 
and objects, many of which were related to other programmes of action and other 
logics (Hinchliffe 2007).  Among these were: changes to hunting practices, border 
controls, surveillance and testing, trade restrictions, public information campaigns, 
vaccination policies, mass culling, market manipulation, corporate restructuring, food 
imports, reports, parliamentary reviews and so on.  This was hardly the pure and 
simple establishment of a (sovereign) state of biosecurity, a predetermined and 
coordinated national response to a known threat.  This was the usually trial and error 
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and often desperate attempt to enact different, partially connected, avian influenzas 
and the associated reshaping of worlds that stretched into, pervaded through, and 
reached out of Cairo as the central but widely distributed player in a rapidly unfolding 
drama.   
 
 A question to ask at this point is how do these various practices, places and 
things interact with one another?  What are, to use other terms, the interferences (Law 
2004; Mol 2002) or ecologies of action (Hinchliffe, et al. 2006)? We can trace four 
kinds of interference here.   
 
 Firstly, places, practices and things can interfere in ways that support and 
reinforce each other through operational and ideological cross-fertilisations and cross-
subsidies.  In the case of Cairo, for example, it would be foolish to ignore how neatly 
the WHO and FAO’s proclamations on the wild and unregulated causes and 
consequences of avian influenza chimed with the Egyptian government’s 
longstanding and ongoing attempts to ‘clean up’ Cairo in order to present it as a 
shining beacon of Africa modern(ist) (see Mitchell (2002) for much more detail on 
this battle).  Cairo’s backyard and rooftop flocks became something of a ‘target of 
opportunity’ (Weber 2005).  Likewise, in the name of securing the health of the 
national body politic the apparatuses of international agribusiness and Northern 
biosecurity diktats have meshed to produce a landscape of opportunity.  Once the cull 
policy had been settled the government had to ease import restrictions on frozen meat 
and other protein products to make up for domestic shortfalls (especially in the lead 
up to and during Ramadam when food consumption increases).  The restrictions had 
previously been part of a plan to reduce the national debt crisis and to encourage more 
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domestic production (Mitchell 2002).  In another move which benefited large 
multinational corporations, commercial Egyptian farms were restocked with chicks 
from the US and Europe and, as we have noted, there was now massive commercial 
potential for an expansion of factory farming in the country.   
 
 On the other hand (and secondly), it is also not difficult to identify how the 
same events involved activities which might be clear contradictions of one another.  It 
is unclear, for example, how the shift from small producers to commercial factories 
ultimately aids national sovereignty and biosecurity in Egypt or elsewhere.  For what 
it produces in the name of eradication and purity is at once a whole set of food 
insecurities (the country is no longer self-sufficient) and quite possibly – as various 
commentators from academics, (Davis, 2005), NGOs (Grain, 2006a, b, Bird Life 
International, 2006) to medics (Editorial, The Lancet, 2006) have suggested – the very 
conditions of animal density and bio-simplicity that can nourish viral multiplication.   
 
Although perhaps the easiest to point to, and most familiar in terms of 
conventional social science accounts, reinforcement and contradiction are by no 
means the only kind of interference that can emerge between different modes of 
biosecuring.  A disease like bird flu is constituted thirdly of other ecologies of action 
including confusion (for example in the relationship between vaccination and culling 
programmes), concession (for example when the government were forced to rein back 
the extent of the cull in rural areas leaving public information and surveillance in the 
ascendancy in those parts of the country), adaptation (for example when the 
government had to manipulate the market to provide cheap poultry in the run up to 
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Ramadan), accommodation (for example when the complete failure of the Chinese-
sourced vaccine became apparent and restocking became a priority). 
 
 Finally, we want to note how securing the bio can take the form of a paradox.  
In Eugene Thacker’s work in this area, for example, he notes how a certain, 
becoming-dominant version of biosurveillance can be characterised as what the US 
defence industry refers to as ‘netwars’.  That is to say, they involve ‘networks fighting 
networks, in which one type of network is positioned against another, and the 
opposing topologies made to confront each other’s respective strengths, robustness, 
and flexibilities’ (Thacker 2005a: 8).  Increasingly diseases (as well as terrorist 
organisations) are conceived of as having a network topology, as attempts to produce 
a distributed mode of existence, one that is self-organising, mutable and in process.  
Such forms of organisation are highly resistant to top-down, centralized forms of 
control and thereby, networks require networks to fight them. The paradigmatic case 
has become the relative success of the WHO’s efforts to combat SARS (see other 
chapters in this volume) – involving a “hybrid of computers, communications, 
hospitals, health advisories, and … medical countermeasures such as quarantine and 
travel restriction” (Thacker 2005a:12).  Yet as Thacker goes on to suggest, the 
topological realisation of netwars is possibly not radical enough – for in the current 
design of biosurveillance and disease surveillance networks (DSNs), there remains a 
logic of control and instrumentalism, one that underestimates the nonhuman and 
thereby fails to adjust to the indeterminate characteristics of networks.  The challenge 
as he says of establishing sovereignty within a network becomes a necessary paradox, 
where the need for control is also the need for an absence of control (Thacker 2005a: 
13).  It may just be that the dynamism and looseness of a disease network, its 
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adaptabilities and accommodations (from the conformations of amino acid cleavages 
to the hiding of animals) is what gives it strength.  This would explain why purifying 
schemes and conventional surveillance tend to fail.  And would suggest that the 
martial metaphor of a war on disease is not quite right.  In terms of taking this 
forward, a guide might be to ask, with this paradox of control in mind, just as Donna 
Haraway has done in the past with the immunological body (Haraway 1991) and 
Annemarie Mol has done more recently with the logic of care (Mol forthcoming) – 
whether we might find in these practices any hints that there are other ways of 
collectively living with disease than imagining that we are perpetually in conflict with 
it, ways that recognise rather than repress the fragile stabilities involved. 
 
5. Conclusions [h1] 
In concluding this discussion of avian flu and its various networks we will make three 
points.  First, cities are themselves in process and are not simply networked by 
diseases – they also network and in so doing are dynamic and are being made.  The 
same can be said for nation states.  Neither the urban nor the state are explanations for 
disease or for its control, they are rather the fragile outcomes of a host of activities 
and materialities.  Cities, states and diseases are being made in a variety of places, 
through many different kinds of practices and with all manner of different things.  In 
the case of bird flu in Cairo and Egypt, the management of disease cannot be 
described as a nation state imposing its power or will on society – nor for that matter 
would we suggest that there was a well-formed resistance on the part of society.  
Rather, city, state and disease and society are in process in this story – their 
boundaries and the distinctions between them are not pre-set.  To be sure this does not 
make our account apolitical – indeed it is the assertion of new forms of practice and 
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new ecologies of action that may redistribute expertise and knowledge in Egypt (from 
household food production to large commercial holdings).  The analysis here suggests 
only that this process is not pre-ordained or following some pre-established social 
order.  Rather the process is dynamic, always heterogeneous and open to political 
contestation.  Moreover, while we have focused on the practices rather than the ideas 
of biosecurity in this chapter our point is not so much that things don’t necessarily 
work out as they were planned (although that is of course part of it) or even that there 
are or need to be local enactments of more global methods.  Rather it is to argue that 
in the making of a biosecure state there is always an issue of heterogeneity – which 
we take to indicate that there is always more at stake than that which is to be included 
in the making of a social order.  From the roof-top poultry keepers to the mutable 
viral forms, there is more to the performance of state than the idea of a modern city 
form. 
 
 Second, and relatedly, rather than inadvertently promoting the programmes of 
the already powerful by suggesting that their schemes are both singular and likely to 
bear fruit, we would suggest that any attempt at biosecurity is already multiple, made 
up of a number of modes of ordering (Law 1994).  Thus we have talked of modes of 
securing.  We are trying to emphasise a number of things with this term: 
- that there is likely to be more than one mode of securing in operation in any 
situation. 
- that modes will relate to one another in ways that can be mutually supportive, 
destructive, indifferent, in conflict, coexist, reduce each other’s effectiveness and so 
on. 
 21
- that each mode is practised and thereby marks an imperfect attempt at security.  
Therefore, rather than call them modes of security they are securings.  The resulting 
state of security will always be, more or less, provisional and subject to change. 
- that these modes are heterogeneous and distributed over a wide array of actors and 
things, and don’t have a thinking human subject at their centre.  They are not 
therefore equivalent to rationalities.   
- that the potent mixings and interplays within and between people, places, animals, 
forms, chemicals, embargos, cells and so on are more than likely to be generative, to 
produce new conformations. 
 
 Our final point is that given this heterogeneity and incompleteness, biosecurity 
may be as much about surrendering control as it is about jurisdiction over the bios.  
While it is clearly contentious to argue against efforts to eliminate disease when 
people’s lives and livelihoods are at stake there is nevertheless a strong sense that 
when emergency gives way there are reasons to generate broader debates as to the 
proficiency of current stories, practices and methods in terms of their ability to 
address networking diseases.  
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